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1' Final Plea Koerner
Ir. President, your Honors:.
Defense counsel are aware that this honorable Tribunal does
not place any special value on the final plea. The Tribunal is
Df the opinion that it is the duty of defense counsel to submit
to the Tribunal, in the closing brief and in addition, perhaps,
also in separate trial briefs, their orderly and complete views
of their respective cases. According to our own G-erm-n procedural-
law, we are accustomed to address the Tribunal once directly in a
tri.'lL and to express once directly what we think. In doing so,
X shall endeavor to be as brief and clear as possible in my
rendition, tind I respectfully request the Tribunal to give me its
•learing for the short period of time placed at my disposal for
attempt to outline an over-all picture of the unusually voluminous
trial data. It was not ideas and paper-work that I desired to
submit^, but, much rather, I desired to represent in my own person
the Cause entrusted into my hands.
I
First of all, it appears necessary to me for all the
happenings of this tri.vd to be shown jointly in their over-all
Causal relation, where they belong. Where do we stand? The
answer appears to be a simple one. This is the last Hurnoerg
trial, the case tried before the IMT being the first of the series,
Ihe trials in their'entirety have the sembl:-uice of a circle which
is now closing. Nothing would be a more erroneous view to hold
than that one* In as much as the counts of aggressive warfare,
>s
Spoliation, and slave labor are concerned, the conditions under
Which the International Military Tribunal operated were utterly
different from those of this last trial. The judges of the IITT,
as well as the world that heard the judgment they pronounced,
were still in a position to believe thuat the new law which
ii.-i iiiln.^ -Tm, I .'•-.r,--ia.^,-riiMittiWimiihiW*r'iiV ii'i ifMim
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ie IMT was endeavoring to establish would become reality and oe
•ecognized throughout the worlds Xou, the honorable Judges, the
lefendants you are trying, and we others, are no longer able to
relieve that. The law administered by the IMT has turned out to
nave developed into special law, that is, special law applying to
Ghose men who were sentenced there„ 'That is not the fault of the
International Military Tribunal. The cause is to be found in the
copduct of the nations affected by the law administered by the
IMT, all of whom slighted it. Who is still going to maint;dn today
that aggressive warfare is prohibited? Who is there who would
3yen only raise the question as to the aggressor in the war now
5e^ng Waged between Palestine fmd the Arabian states? Who is going
to fLsh as to who is the aggressor in Indonesia, or whether or not
the aid furnished the insurgents in China or in Greece by Soviet
'^ ^ussia represents a prohibited aggression by the Soviet Russians'
yery own definition as contained in their treaties of 1r33?
leality has passed over the IMT Judgment since the time it was
jrQnounced. The proper administration of justice demands a
•3orrespending conviction of sentiment and requires a binding charac
ter of law — as I have already previously elaborated on in my
Ripening statement. Even had aggressive warfare been banned at thp
time the IMT Judgment v/as passed, this is certainly not the case
«
today by virtue of the gener;l us:Lge practiced by the community
^f nations, either by nations having by their very ovm actions
Ignored the ban as proncounced, or by the n;j.tions having acquiesced
in the violation of the ban by word or action. The same applies to
the other principles of law applied by the IMT. M;iybe never be
fore were there as many forced laborers as at this very moment
in which I address you. The general disregard" of the principles
of ownership by politics, \vhich is most closely inter-llnhed
vith the problem as to whether so—c.-tlled spoliation may or may not
oe considered a war crime, has rarely In the history of m;ihfcioid
11 '.Ml
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reached its present degree,>
All of this implies that the position held oy this Triounrtl
is quite different from that of the IM. This TrrDiJin;a tahes up
i very solitary position in :.4n utterly ch.-ijiged world. At le^-.st
the identical significance will be attributed to the last of the
!qmberg judgments iis was attributed to the first. The IMT judgment
las become a piece of history; and can never ;Lny more have the
effect of a precedent case, just as little as .*tny other judgment
Dan remain a precedent case which was pronounced pursujuit to a
statute of law that was rescinded. In this connection X will not
enter into any discussion of the problem whether, according to
the intents of the Statute or of the principles of international
law, the IMT judgment could ever have had the effect of a precedent
cbise at Jill, and in the same manner I will omit any discussion of
a "problem already elaborated on by me in a separate brief, that is,
the problem as to whether Article 10 of Ordln.-Lnce No. 7 is binding
or not. This Honorable Tribunal will have to deal with the new
law meanwhile come into Being. That is the reason for my
niaintalning that equ.-a slgnlfio/ince is to be attributed to
"the judgment of this Tribunal as to the IMT judgment. The defense
Dounsel v/ere told that the IMT judgment was born out of' idealistic
aotives, in the intent to replace the world of force by a world of
justice under law. This concept which — I assume — is Incorporated
for you in the very Word "Numberg", is sufficiently compromised
byvthe fact that Russia was represented in the 3MT in the capacity
of judex inhabilis, that is, a judge who had partiqipated himself
in the crime on which he was passing sentence, i.e,, the attack
on Poland. This fact is proven by the secret German-Russo
treaty, the terms of which h.ave meanwhile been published, and
^ omit mentioning Russitt's attack
Finnl Ple-i Koerner
•/'.W
1 Finland which led to her expulsion fr*om the League of Nations
I 1940. In like manner, everything you \vitness here in the way
L genuine intent is compromised oy everything that was done in
a.'tlity in the world since the end of the war. The effect of
his course of development does not exhaust Itself merely in the .
•i.ct that the justice administered oy the IIuIT has become oDsolete.,
f .-inything is to be saved at .-ai of Numberg, it is the belief
hat there were to be found a few men who gave precedence to justice
•nder law above everything else and who put this principle into
oturil practice even at a time when its application had the very
ontrary effect of wtuat the world, the world* s prejudices and its
i.bit of thinking, anticipated. This, Your Honors, is the over-
II aspect which forms the basis of my considerations of this
rial.
- '• A. ♦ '•
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Before undertal^ing to discuss the individu-il problem of
Koerner'8 c;-.se in order to illustrnte the inferences which, in
my opinion, should be dr;twn from this basic concept, I propose
to discuss, with the brevity Imposed upon me by lach of time,
some gener.-il problems of law which h.-ive crept up over and over
again in the course of the Numberg tri*ils.
1. Already in my opening sta.tement X avowed that only valid
international law may be applied, irrespective of the contents
of the Charter of Control Council Law No, 10, and that, fLCcording
to the principles of law of .all civilized nations, the more
lenient provision of law must be applied in the event that l-tw
should have met with change between the time of perpetration of
the deed and the time when judgment is passed. The applic-Ltion
of ;4.n ex post facto law is precluded in this connection, ;ind in
order to strengthen my view I appeal to the words pronounced by
Military Tribunal No. V in Case VIZ, as follows;
"... anything in excess of existing Internation-a law
therein contained is a utilization of power -ind not of
law,..."'
Nothing need be added to this, all the less so in view of
t^he fact that, in substance, Military Tribun-d. No, XV in Case V
book the s;tme view.
Whence are we to gain knowledge of valid Internation.-il laT,v?,
G-eneral jurisprudence -as taught is known, and for its
oorroboration X refer to Article 38 of
11 1 •' •
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Jhe Charter of the InternationrLl Trlhunal of the United Nations.
It is set forth therein that common Il,aw, as an expression of a
general usage recognized ;is law, is also one of the sources of
international law. This is of particular signific.'ince for this
trir.a. In the same portion of the text it is stated that earlier
judicial findings may only enter into consideration as auxiliary
neans for the recognition of law. It is from such a preceding
judicial finding, that is to say, from the IMT judgment, that X
•an now going to quote one sentence containing a reference of
oarticular significance for the recognition of international lav;,
?he IMT stated:
"The law is not static, out by continual adaptation
follov;s the needs 3f a changing world."
The tivLppenings of the last years adequately illustrate the extent
•tnd the speed with which the world is changing, and it is the
natur-a duty of the Tribunal to adjust itself to these changes
•and to verify the true contents of international law at the time
judgment is passed.
I Can only cursorily mention the grave misgivings existing in
pposition to the concept of the IW^ concerning the contents of
aw Valid at the time it pronounced its Judgment. As you know,
he IMT Was of the opinion that, under valid internation.-il law,
:he individual as such ,'vLso has commitments tov/ards internatiomil
aw and is liuole under international criminal law. The
lUpeequent Nurnberg Military Tribunals
IfeViV
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-•ok over this point of view. As opposed to that, there is to oe
aid that up to the present time all st-ites are guarding tneir
sovereignty more je.-aously th;in ever before find thut obviously
^he full sovereignty of the individual state is inooopatiDle
vith any direct liability of its citizens. There is no state, as
'et, that acknowledges the -precedence of internation.-a 1-iw over
its intern.'_a national law -md, up to now, the Constitution of
the United States, which speoific.-aiy establishes the precedence
of national law, has not yet been amended in that point. Juris
prudence of .-ai countries is uniform.aiy of the s-one point of view,
•J.-iokson possibly being the sole exception. As far -is I im
concerned, it seems to me of particular signifi c-jice that the
competent commission of the United Nations decided not to formulate
the Nurnberg prinoi-ples, .-.md that, as yet, the United N-itions
have failed to set up .-oi intern-itional tribunal having jurisdiction
to try crimes under international law. As a matter of f-xot, two
of the creators of the London Charter, even, i.e., Britain .-tnd ,
t;he Soviet Union, h-xve opposed the setting up of such a tribun-a.
Jh the face of these facts it becomes difficult to understand
that the liability of the individual citizen for violation of
lnternation;a law is to be representative of valid international
law. It seems to me that Jackson is wrong in maintaining that,,
in any case, the Nurnberg principles today have the effect
In re.-.aity, international law is still nothing out 1 iw exls S
If! relations between the nations. This suffers no oh.inge
Sver as a result of the fact that, under intern-ition il law
In effect up to now,
•i-I iiH - iMf li'Jtrf rTI'i- i^'rtrdVht >i lir ••tiM-i'• il i il' ' i . . nirain
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in individuril cases citizens may oe held liable directly. For
what is involved are very specific and sharply defined exception;^!,
elements of crime, as, for example, piracy or p.artisrn warfare.
^?he Case of ex parte Qpirin, also referred to in Nurnberg
jurisdiction, is one which was rulways subordinate to nationrjd
jurisdiction, i.e., the case of espionage, and in view of that
it by no means proves the general vr^lldity of the principle ,
of individual liability for violations of internatlonra law.
I will confine myself to giving a slight Indication only
of the unbearable conflict in which ;in individur.a is engaged who
simultaneously is bound to obey internationra law as well as the
law of his own country. Because the case is either that of the
individu^a obeying the laws of his own country, subsequently
to be held liable for doing so, lihe the defend.-bts in this
trial, or he obeys what he considers to be international lavj, for
the doing of which he is later on, of necessity, abandoned oy
the community of nations, whose laws he obeyed, to the power of
criminal prosecution held by his own country. The United St iteg
does not permit the individual to refuse to obey the laws of his
country on these grounds; see the well-hnovm judgment of t^ie
Supreme Court versus Mackintosh. Protego ergo oblige —
only one offering protection may impose commitment. The
community of nations is unable to offer protection, least of all
during war. Therefore, it was right to say, as has been s iid,
that the Charter and the IMT undertook the second step oefore
the first had been made. First of all, you must have a community
Vinder international
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aw, which is ca:?able of conunanding :jn'd protecting, :ind only
,fter it has been established may the individual be expected to
b'ey this community under international law. It is instrucbive
•rd, it seems to me,, convincing to observe that, since the IliT
udgment was passed, nowhere throughout the wide world has the
.ttempt been made' to prosecute .'iny person guilty of one of the
.'•rimes esta.blished as liable for punishment by the Charter and
Oontrol Council Law No. 1©. There has cert,-.inly been no lack of
perpetrators of thebe crimes since 1945. X do not think I have to
substantiate this fact by evidence, but may assume this to be known
to the Tribunal•
2. X h;ive previously already touched upon a further oroolem
v/hich is of fund-tmentra signific.ance for the Judgment to be passed
oy this honorable Tribunal. X shall deal with it in greater
detail in a special brief. I am referring to the question of the
independence of this Tribunal from the ILT Judgment, At this
point X would confine myself to pointing out that precedents -are
non-existing in lnterna,tlon;a law rmd that the Tribunal of the
League of Nations, as well as that of the United Nations, both
specific^aiy precluded the effect of precedents in their charters,
in both the respective charters it reads as follows:
" ... decision of the court has no binding force except
between the parties rind In respect of the particular
case...,^
Tlqe Charter of the International Tribun.*il of the United Nations,
irj enumerating the sources of law for internatlon.-Ll law, under
Bpeoi;Al reserve of Article 59, specifies earlier Judici.-il
findings as being only 'Oi auxiliary me?Lns supporting the,findings
ipf the Tribunal, but not as representing precedent cases.
1© Fin.-il PleM Koorner
In addition to this> Jaokson^s statement of 4 Decemoer 1945 to
the IMT has to be "some in mindj to the effect that, in part,
a military tribun-il v/as set up in the place of the usu-il
qrimin.al court of Justice
in order to .-ivold cre.-.tlng nny effect of prooedsnt
by wh:it is h.-ropening here pursu-int to our ovm Ij', -tsu nau nappeiiixife iicx-s v.*- •
well as to esc.ape the compelling force of precedents
which would arise if we ^^ere faced here oy a tri»un.a
of the usu^a type,"
Article 10 of erdin-.nce No. 7 Aoes not oirtnge anything in this
respect, for the Amerio-oi Milit.-iry Government is obviously
not in .-I, position to amend internation.-il law wnioh does not hno •
the compelling force of precedents.
1/ Official issue volume III, 605,
r hi
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I shall now deal with the y.arious elements of Koerner's
Case, First of all, with aggressive war. In the light of the
evidence my client Koerner could only be connected, if at all,
with the so-called aggressive war against Russia. I could there
fore confine myself to dealing only with this war. in dealing
with this War I could again confine myself to pointing out that
my client is in no way criminally connected with the preparation
or waging of this war. The charge of having contributed to the
Initiation of the Second 'forld 'far ife so grave, however, that X
am compelled to comment In general terms on the criminality of
aggressive wars, including the question whether the Russian war
was en aggressive war at all within the meaning of International
Law.
1. The Defendants in this case can only be punished for
planning, preparing, and waging aggressive wars if these acts
at the time of their commission were criminal and if aggressive
war is still criminal today. Neither condition has been met.
At the time Poland and Russia were attached, the view that
individuals were to be criminally liable for an aggressive war
Conducted by their countries had never been enunciated. As far
as Can be ascertained
I.
'T-
K'r-
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no reference was ever made to penalties attached to
aggressive war throughout the war, whereas punishment for war-
crimes and crimes against humanity had been proclaimed by
the Allies ever since 1941, The Moscow Declaration of 1943
which the authors of the charter considered so important as
to make it an integral part of the London Agreement does not
contain a single word of aggressive war. It is mentioned for
the first time in June 1945, after the end of the war to the
initiation of which it refers in the report made by Jackson to
the president of the United states. The inclusion of aggres
sive War as a crime in the London Agreement and thus in the
charter and Control Council Law No. 10 dates back to the recom
mendation of professor Trainln, the representative of Soviet
Russia in London. Soviet Russia attached Poland in the fall
of 1939 and waged an aggressive war against Rinland in the
winter of 1939-1940. The nations assembled in London knew that.
The concept of Judex inhabilis is well knoT^m, Russia was a
legislator inhabilis, a legislator who is himself a pemetra-
tor demanding the issuance of an ex post facto law to punish
his accomplices. It can hardly be assumed that such a legis
lator is actuated by the wish to enforce law; it is" rather to
be assured that his action is dj.dtated by political expediency.
The intervention of the legislator inhabilis is the proper
origin of the codification of the crliae of aggressive war, ACr-
cordlngly it seems to be a fact that until after the end of
the Second World War
m'm*
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• term aggressive war had not "become a firmly fixed concept
;hln the legal thinking «f the nations, let alone at the time
3 aggressions took place.
At the time this Tribunal will have to pronounce judgment,
least three ^^^ars are being conducted: in Palestine, Indonesia,
d in China- In each of the three wars there must needs be an
ggresso'r," but no one demands or even thinks of demanding his
nishment, I do not think that this is pure chance nor a mere
-.ission, but the expression of a true conviction as to the law,
' aggressive wars were considered criminal then the whole world,
ter the experiences of the second 'forld war, would be unanimous
. their demand to punish the new offenders. But the world is
lent; aggressive wars are not yet criminal- Jackson stated,
though in 1941
"Movement, progress, and readjustment win not be
renounced by the world as the orice of oeace.
Whenever there is no chance, apart from war, of
escaping the burden of the status quo, we shall
have war- And nerhsps, if it is tne only way
out, we ought to have war," {Translated from the
G-erman version. )
That is correct and will remain so until a supra-national
verelgnty will afford an opportunity of eliminating the causes
• Wars,
m::.- •
tt
Speech at the Annual Mooting of the American Bar Association
: Indianapolis on 2 October 1941. Quoted from "world orga.niza-
-on and present Pay problems of international Law, ' by Meyer in
-e Review "Wandlung," 1948, p- 52-
i .
•te-'-'-,
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refer to Sdvrard Tf, Carr, who said, ^
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"War is, at present, the most purposeful of our
social institutions, and we shall mahe no progress
tending to eliminate it until we recognize the
essential social function it performs and pro
vide a substitute for it." (Translated from
the G-erman version. "
1.beliove, therefore, that we" have no alternative today but
0 affirm the legal status prevailing today that aggressive wars
^ re not criminal or at least that they no longer are as I em-
haslzed before. I have already pointed out that the London Agree-
ent, the London Charter, and Law No. 10 are irrelevant if Inter-
atlonal Law is at variance with them.. That there could be no
ore lofty objective than to eliminate wars from the life of the
atlons is a completely different issue. The path to be travelled
oes not, however, go via a special criminal law for individuals
ut through a limitation of state sovereignty^
2. Regarding the Russian War, the evidence has established
he correctness of my contention that this war was not a criminal
•ggresslve war, even under the London jigreoment or Law- No. 10, but
I preventive war to counter an impending Russian attack. Hitler
nly decided upon war against Russia when he had convinced himself
f.the seriousness and imminence of the threat implied in the
fssian deployment of forces In 1940 and in the aggres.sive Russian
^IJlcy. My Document Book II with its supplements, which is de-
oted exclusively to this topic, speaks for Itself,
tt
Edward w. Carr, "Conditions of Poaba," London 1942, p.. 116.
7f' |i ;•' .
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The Russian line-up of forces in Hay 1941, that is four to
weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, is well knoT^m,
' Q line-up was not in the nature of a defensive deployment agains"^
G-erman Army which had meanwhile also been assemoled, but clearly
ws the characteristics of an aggressive deployment. This aggres-
e nature is Confirmed by two such expert witnesses as G-enerals
2)
.der and Hoth . I think that the entire evidence is so weighty
at in my plea I may proceed from the actual position as being
zh that a Russian attack was Imminent and that Hitler feared this
o aPk.
What is the legal position under these conditions? It has
-^ays been recognized that there is a necessity under international
''f which is paramount to all other laws, Vattel, an a.ckno '^''l^^dged
thprity, says that a nation is entitled to forestall an injustice
d that a wrong is the cause for every just war, whether the
^ong has already been inflicted or is imminent. Creasy says
ry ®tly that the real aggressor is not he who first uses force,
ct he who necessitates the use of force. ^ Evidence that this
•. universal legal dodtrine can be found throughout the literature
aling with international Law. I will content m-self with quoting
r^hey
l)Map in Koerner Document 405, Ktxhlbit 98, Book II
^'nxhlblt 98 and Haider testimony 9 September 1948, Morning
ission, page 20,573 of the GerQian Transcript.
150.
"T.flw of Nations" Book 3, par. 26
'^ ^Creasy: "First platform of International Law," 1876,
FXHAL ?LFA KOFHKFP.
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iiD wrote in 1929, that is after the conclusion of the KsHog Pact:
"The right of self-defense has precedence over all other •
rights and duties and is much more than a right within
the coiiimon meaning of this term; it is a orinciple under
lying all positive laws and usages." (Translated from
the German version.)
In discussing the question whether the German attack on
Torway could he justified as preventive war, the IMT in principle
affirmed it, and referred to the Caroline case. In the exchange of
lotes regarding this case, the U.S. Secretary, of State, Webster,
recognized the law of self-defense defining it in terms reiterated
by the imt that there must be,
"necessity qf self-defense instant, overwhelming and
leaving no choico of means and no moment for delibera
tion "
flven those very strict, and in my opinion too narrowly defined,
Conditions attaching to the law of self-dcfenso were met at the
^ime Hitler was confronted by the Russian concentration of forces^.
The occupation of Rumania which was allied to Gercany would alone
have boon sufficient to render impossible future German self-
j^efonse because Germany depended on the Rumanian oil fields. The •
^pd-nion thd:; Nelson' s seizure of the Danish fleet in the port of
'•openhagen in 1307 was a legitimate act of self-defense is
^parently still being maintained by all Anglo-Saxon writers,
Cf this ooinlon is correct, then Germany's attack in 1941, which
•ras to forestall a Russian aggression, is certainly no violation
cf International Law,
X)
Hershey, p, 17; "The Essentials of the International. Law
and Organization," Nbw York 1929, p. 132.
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Roosevelt said* in 1942- ^!^hen I see a rattlesnaJce rearing
3 head, I do not wait for it to strike; I crush it firsv.
ranslated from the G-erman version, )
. Nor did the Kellog Pact preclude preventive wars. The opinion
Id by the contracting parties is authoritative. The American
oassador's note, dated 23 June 1928, inviting G-ermany to accede
the Kellog Pact, says;
"There is'nothing in the American draft of an anti
war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the
right of self-defense ... every nation ... alone iscom-
petent to decide whether circumstances require recourse
to War in self-dofonse.-"
preventive war thus remains legitimate,
. The dodtrino under International Law that only unprovoked
•gression is prohibited, whereas a provoked attack allows logi-
mate self—defense, tends to the saiTic conclusion.
As a result the Gorman invasion of Russia was not a prohibito4
:gressive war. The charge against my client lachs any foundetlon
•en if, contrary to my opinion, aggressive Trrar were criminal today,
lather the German attack was, objectively speaking, a legitimate
••t-pf defense, is'immaterial. No criminality attaches to it
pause there is no criminal Intent if my client believed and
.'uld believe that tne Gorman attack and its preparations took
-ace for tho ourpose of self-dofonse.
TT
Koorner Document 335, Exhibit 114, Document Book II
•.-.V
55J'-i
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This has bean established by the evldencej nor would it bo
3nged if the Tribunal is persuaded by the evidence that Russia
in fact want to attack but does not regaj'd it as an established
it that Cjorijiany* s attack was an act of self-defense.^^ Even
such a Case there would be no criminal intent attaching to my
ent.
3. To decide whether a defendant can be punished for planning,
eparatlon, or waging of aggressive wars under International Law,
^e primary factor, according to the judgments of the Nuernberg
'ibunals, is whetner his -position was in fact high enough to include
m .in the circle of those who may be punished under International
w. Let mo point out how narrowly the IMT fixed the circle of
•Imlnal responsibility for aggressive war. Koorner was below
at; lino which the Farbon judgment in Case VI referred to- "Some
PSonablo standard must, therefore, be found by which to measure
.2)
e degree of participation necessary to constitute a crime...
—Ti
The result would be that both States arc to be regarded
aggressors. This idea is not now in the doctrine of interna-
enal Law, and the G-oneva record, dated 2 October 1924, express-
mentions this Case in Article 11,
2)
p. 15,706 of the English Transcript.
ilk;
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Undoubtedly Koarner did not belong to tlia circle of the archi-
ts and leaders of war, but Has on a much lower level, below the,
ioal line of division botwoan the guilty and innocent. I shall
racteriz-e Koerner^s actual position at greater length at the
of my closing statement.
4. If, in spite of the evidence, tho Tribunal should have some
ibts whether Koerner might not be a member of the circle that is
Iffllnally liable for the preparation of sn aggressive war, there
1 oe no criminal liability on the part of my client for reasons
fact. For the evidence has show that,
1) The work of the Four-Year plan did not aim at
:ression, ^ .
2) Koerner did not, nor could he, or was he oouncx iso
.nk of an aggressive war.
5) Koerner did not actively participate in the prepara-
p of the Russian war.
As for Kcerner>s participation in the preparation of the
lish War 'in 1939, the prosecution could not adduce anything but
) fact that Koerner ^-ras State Secretary of the Four-Year plan
,l Ijiiat the jurisdiction of the Four-Year plan also included tasks
i'v^ng G-erman rearmament.
According to the opinion of the Nuernberg Tribunals established
jOe tho imT Judgment against Sohacht, rearmament is not criminal
itself. The essential factor is whether whoever partlclpetos
fearmament in fact knew of aggressive plans. The prosecution
ro unable
ycVV • • •
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ifrove that this was the case with Koerner. Thus any charge
ainst him is unfounded. The general reference of the prosecution
the extent or the speed of armament are completely mistaken,
that time the reasons for rearmament were plausible for every
trlotic-mlnded G-erman. One did not have to think of aggressive
r as an explanation. The menace to Germany from her neighbors, •
rticularly in the East, was so strong and had been so sharply
'It for a decade and a hal-f that everybody assumed that rearmament
'S to protect Germany. This is especially true of Koerner be-
1
'Use he knew Hitler*e memorandum from the summer of 1936, which
•nstitutos the birth certificate proper of the Four-Xear Plan
which Hitler quite clearly expressed that, in addition to
neral considerations of economic policy, it was the menacing
ssian danger which prompted him to promote such economic mesr-
res as were subsequently carried out under the Four-Xear plan,
•art from that the idea that Germany might possibly attack nolgh-
ning Countries was quite alien to my client Koerner whoso truly
eply amiable nature, ready for every reasonable compromise, was
no way inclined to violence and injustice.
As against this, the prosecution have laid great stress on
e fact that Gocring repeatedly med-o speeches full of war-like
rases. The testimony of the witnesses has shown that these
rases were not to be and were not taken werlously. In addi-
who
on the evidence has shown that Goorlng, in truth, was a ma^very
rongly championed the •oreservation of peace
Fl^AL PL3A KOSHNSH
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1 that Kocrner at any rate was convinced of G-oerlng^s peaceful
tentions. The IMT^, which described him as the driving force behind
rs of aggression, is completely mistaken. If there was any one
o was against all wars, and again and again worked for peace,
Lat appears to have been Hoering* That is of importance here
the prosecution appajr'ently infer that my client is incriminated
- having been a member of Goering's close associates and a por-
nal friend of his. Goering*s conduct remained constant, start-
g from the Munich Agreement where he was a dscisive force in se-
ring the agreement, followed by his disapproval of the invasion
• the protectorate and his peace efforts with Dahlerus, and end-
g I'Txth the dramatic scene described by my client, when testifying
his own behalf, when Gearing returned from his visit to Hitler
his
31 August 1939, Hitler had communicated to him/" • final de-
slpn to attack Poland and now Goering was sitting despondently
his study, putting his head and his arms on the table, and break-*
g forth into indignant criticism, propinquity to Goering does
^ argue in favor of readiness for war but readiness for peace,
"What has been said for the period until 1939 is equally
'e for the period preceding the beginning of the Russian war,
addition, however, every evidence shows my client did not in
it actively participate in the economic preparation of the Rus-
^ War. It Was not Koernor but Gon.^ral Thomas who received and
^hled through Goering's mission to activate an economic organiza-
).h in the East. The Economic Staff East (tflrtshaftsfuohrungsstab
3^^
M-'"fe.
. ♦ I * ' \ t ' . ,', ^ T".
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which Koerner wes to be a member, did not start to function
Cil after the beginning of the Russian campaign.
5. I have thus shown that my ollenis cannot be held criminally
sponsiblo for Germajn war preparations. The prosecution contend
at Koerner is also responsible for the waging of aggressive wars.
this regard only Koernerts function as a member of the Economic
aff East Could possibly be relevant. The evidence has shown that
Ls staff, contrary to its name, was not charged with the conduct
affairs, and did not have any power of decision. Besides, it
on stopped its worh. Koerner was only connected with Russia to
-3 pxtcnt that Goering's authorities also extended to economy in
3 iiast. If the circle of those liable for the preparation and
Itlatlon of an aggressive war must be fixed very narrowly, so much
r.Q must be the division of those held responsible for its con-
-t. Only men in top, responsible, .leading positions can be con-
. 1)
••epea. Here, again, the facts are that the actual connection
my client with the economic control of occupied Russia very
^se and his sphere of influence extremely slight. if the IMT
u,itt(^d even Speer and Sauckel of the charge of waging aggressive
, It is idle to discuss whether Koerner, wiio held an infinitely
e humble position, of much less Import for the conduct of the
, 5-8 to be convicted. His acts cerfainly do not constitute the
Irig of aggressive war.
1)
MT Judgment regarding ^rick, '^f"^icial Publio«tion, p.
.of the English, p. 337 of the German,
i- .
i*.
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1. The second crarge vdiich the irosecution has raised
against my client coacerns so-called spoliation. I have already
emphasised in my opening statement that the irosecntion's desig
nation of spoliation has not been thus defined by the Hague bules
of -L^and h'arfare (XfLKO) , In fact the war-eoonomlc utilisation of
the occupied territories is Involved. The nature and extent oi
this utilisation have been described in the presentation of evi
dence. From the legal point of viev? it has to be ascertained v;here
contemporary International Lav; draws the limits for the utiliza
tion of occupied territories by the occupying power. This Ocaslc
question has so far not been unamoiguously decided oy the trials
conducted in ITurnberg until now.
The IFT judgement has not discussed in detail the concept
of systeniRtic spoliation rhlch it has ooine'^ , anl there vras really
no need to do so because it assumed a state of affairs to exist
which no longer necessitated the investigation of the admlsslbilitr
of mar-economic measures under International haw. Thus the IhT
considered it proven that measures Nvere actually taken, as are
demanded or enumerated in the infamous C-oering speech on 06 August
1942 dealing with the treatment of occupied territories, and the
equally infamotts file note pertaining to a conference ci
secretaries in iiay 1941, which indicated that in the course or a
war against irUssla many millions of husslans would have to starve
to death as a consequence of liermaii measures. On ti.-if be..,'
was in fact superfluous
i&i; >|&.J A<->aUij» '..vagu
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to entertain considerations as to where v/ar necessity ends and
spoliation begins. Apparently the IMT was oL the opinion that,
what it accepted as having been jjrovcn was, in any case, beyond
this liniit, In fact, however, this v/as not the case as has par
ticularly become evident from the presentation of evidence in
this trial,
The industrial trials deal predominantly vdth the evalua
tion of individual cases and industrialists who could have had
individual interests. In this trial, on the other h..nd, lor the
1
first time since the judgment of the ILL the total-economic
process ol the utilization oi territories occupiod by C-i-erriiany is
to be judged, on the ba.sis or ncsv, actual determinations. This
Is not t^^G time to r-i^^o r -iGsorlption of the state of alh^lrs. I
shall deal Y/lth that suhjcct in ray closlnr brief. On the; other
hand I shall describe here at least in general outlines the con
siderations which in my opinion are decisive for the fact, what,
according to presently valid International Law is pormittod for
an occupant, and vdnat is forbiddon for him. The conoopt of sys
tematic spoliation does not-help us in this respect, Tho Irose-
cution has fs'.ilcd to explain what it moans by it. The IMT did
hot explain it either, yihen, therefore, do vre have a violation
of the customs of warfare which is the prerequisite for the ful
fillment of the deed according to the Charter and Article X?
I have already stated in my openin/-, statement ti. ••.t in a
total -war it cannot be proniDiteu to utilize j.rOj..erty ii it is
perrnissable to destroy it. The irosccutioii empha'tically attacked
this a',rg\3ra.ent, v."hich had also been previously voiced in the tliok
and Kpiipp cases, stating that all barriers would be re-raoved if
•im
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this argument were to be put Into effect. This is obviously
Incorrect. The Defense does not recommend that everything should
be permissible, but rather that the line of what is prohibited
should be dravm at a different place than was done by the HLKO
in the year 1907 in several of its provisions, namely, at the
same place for the occupant as for his opponent. Furthermore,
•t:he Prosecution seems to' object to this idea where a majore
adminuE is assumed, that not a minus, but an allud is involved.
That is also incorrect. The problem consists exclusively of the
fa^t to what extent the right or the indivxdu;.! to proi crty has
to give way to v/G.r necessities and total and economic waifare,
and the very samo problem is involved in the dostruction as veil
a.s the utilization or the seizure of property.
Professor Wnhl stated in his final pier, in Case Fo. VI
that warfare of our time is the most inhumane in modern history,
Consequently there cannot be the slightest doubt that the bombing
of open cities and the firing at individual persons violates the
HLKO, and that both would bo exemplary samples of crimes against
humanity if they Virerc not overshadowed by the necessities of v/ar
in the opinion of the victorious as \i7oll as that of the vanquished
nations of the second v'sorld Vi/ar. It is quite immaterial to inter
pose that the bombing vfarfaro by the Allies was solely a reprisal
measure. The decision of the Combined General Stafis of the
Allies (of 10 June 1943) or "The Comoinod bomocr Offensive Pl^n"
does not speak in favor of it. The former Chief of the American
r '-vfS'-;!
•1-
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Air PorcQs, Spp.e.tz, reports on vjhnt considers-tions this declsio.i
wr.s hased.l) Alrondy, in January 1943 the heads of the Allied A;
Forces, besides thp destruction ®f the German industrial capac:
as the aim of the bombing offensive, had decided pn undorminxnf
the morale of the Gorman population up to -the point -vrherc its
capability of offering armed resistance v/ould be broken. The
British Field i'^ arshal Robertson maintained the opinion, ..lre.-.c
in 1921, that attacks on nonmilitary objectives and on the po,
2)
lation Y/ould play r.n outstanding in the next war, Spai
has expressed himself most clearly in his book Air tower •. nd
War Rights", which has become famous,Speight states in 192-
that in future wars the compliance vrith the basic principle of
the Inviolability of the civilian population and the priv-tc
property v/ould be impossible to put Into practice, th^-t It
not be adapted to the nature of modern warfare, ^^nd th^t
quently it had become obsolete from the point of viov; of Inter
national Law.
c
^^Forelgn Affairs, April 1946,
^^Robertson^ "From Private to
page 351. "Moddrn war being largely a matter of
economic life it has turned more and more t^ov:ards th ^
homo comtry and the old principle of making y/ar on y
armies and navies, has been consignod to the oackgroun .
on non-military places may be regarded as barD£.ric . . • ^
are bounded to play a prominent part in the next contes
a far more extensive scrAlo than in the great war.'
3) London, 1924.
'a;
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HGro ho quite correctly omphr.sized that the true aim of
the war is of a solely spiritual character. "It is entirely a ^
question of persuading minds and nothing else", and the means b7
^ivhich the minds are to be persuaded he sees in direct action by
the Air F'orce against the population. The theories of the Ita^
General Douhet have become general knowledge. The roots of moc
air warfare therefore arc based on a change in the views of ali
civilized nations which arose from nev; technical possiDilities
they arc not at all the execution of solely ruprisc.l measure .
in any case, however, aerial v/arfare today ia not considered tr
be a reprisal measure only, but as generally permissible , anc
that is the decisive factor. For the question to what extent j
a total war the. individual has to rrive wr^y to the necessities f
war not only with regard to his right to property but .also wiv/.
regard to his ri^t to live, dive-bomber v/arfare is of special
importance v/ithin the scope of aerial warfare. I have emphasiz
in my opening statement that my document books are incomplete.
A special deficiency lies in the fact that I did not succeed in
time in collecting material on the nat-ire and the large scope o.
this kind of aerial warfare. Consequently I can only refer to
what has come to the knowledge of the Tribunal, and add from my
o\fiTL conviction that the systematic attacks on pe.asants in the
fields, children on their v^?ay to school, trains transporting
people on side-trf.cks, on civilians escaping from trfiins v/hich
had been brought to a stop, and many other instances, show \aita
terrifying clarity wbat today is considered permissible. I
would like to add that I myself have been an
FIKAL PLEA KCEWIER
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n.viator in tu;a v;ars, and that I am ahlo to judge that the targets
in such attacks arc clearly visible to the- aviators, and that
these v;cre not mistakes hut clearly intentional acts. Aerial
warfare, however, only gives us a partial view of modern warfare.
The first, almost decisive step in the direction of the new for:i
of the warfare was the expansion of the sea blockade which aros'.
from the fact that - everything vitally needed by the popvllr.ticm
the blockaded country w-as included in the list of contrabands.
Thus the diffarenco between combattants and non-comb"ttants, v: ^
up to that time had ruled the Continental customs of war and a U
).
the provisions of the HLKO had already been removed. It Is alrc
Lautorprncht's opinion that already hero the change in the natiu
of vmrfare has become apparent,The sea blockade, is part of t
economic vjar, v/hich gradually is reaching the same status as the
war of arms, 'A further part of the economic v/ar is the confis
cation of private property which took place for the first time i
the First h-orld ¥i/ar, namely by England, and subsequently also by
the United States, The characteristics'of all these developmenu
a.ro always the same; namely, the receding into the background o.
any considerations f or the individual, the non-combnttant as v v..
as the combattnnt, in fav'or of achieving the aim of the war.
Speight says in his aforementioned book that the aerial warff rc,,.
as he demands it and' as it has oecome reality in the Second liner.
V/nr,' would beyond a doubt constitute a violtion of Internatioa-'u
Law, Here he refers to International Law In the form in whic! ,
it existed at that time, especially in the HLKO, He adds that
"The so-called Anglo-American and C®ntinental Schoals of
Thought in Internati ona.l Law", British Yearbook of Internationa.
Law, 1931, p.35 , .the inclusion of nearly all the prinoipi
foodstuffs and commoditiGS in the list of absolute contraband
a manifeatatioa of the lasting change v/hich has occurred in the
character of modern warfare. This change in the nature of v;ar
which has ceased to be a mere trial of strengths of the combatt
forces stricte sensu, a change which is now and fundamental.
FINAL PLEP. K(E f.NEI
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one stopped there one would leove nir power unsatisfied, "It is
necessary that International Lav/ should show itself ready to not.
v/ith the times, to be' practical, transigonf^ conciliatory, in '•
face of the now conditions; not precise, pedantic, obstructivo.
\
The most important voico from the Anglo-Saxon world vdth. regar^'
the whole problem is, again La.uterpacht, who says-with regard te
the limitation- of the war'to the armed forces and to the state •
as the sole partner in the conduct oi the war in his literature,
from which I have just quoted, that this is a-theory,. which had
becom.e utterly divorced from the realities of modern warfare. li
I
actual change had begun long before the ^orld V/ar. No account c
it v/.as takon in the numerous provisions of the Hague Com-ontioi,
conceived in an atmosphere of unreality which surrounded much <•
the work of the Hague conferoncos
19. "if one stopped there, one would leave air pov^er a
satisfied. It is necessary that International Lav/ should, shov-
self ready to move with the times, to be practical, transigent,
conciliatory in the face of new conditions, not precise, pedana:
obstructive,"
^^P. 36a.a.0.- • .the abandonment of theory v/hich had bee
utterly divorced from the realities of modern warfare. The actr
change had begun long before the L'orld "Wnr. No account of it v/"
taken in the numerous provisions of the Hague Conventions concei
in the atmosphere ol' unreality v/hich auri'ounded much of the wo;.-
of the Hague conferences."
¥j.\'.' ;.
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e also reference is above all nade to the Ha^ue Rules of land Warfar®,
'.qh the Prasecuticn wants to apply forty years after its existence in a
n^pletely changed world according to its old formulation, and vrhich the
T in part has also made the basis of its judgment. In fact hov/ever,
! these quotations show, there is as little doubt in theory as in practice,
at through the change of modern warfare the protection of private property,
ntrary to all rules v/hich wore formerly set up, has been placed into the
.ckground behind the necessities of warfare, no matter whether an armed
>nflict or an economic war is involved.
With regard to the conclusions, which can be drawn from this for
9 charge of spoliation in this trial, my own opinion merely goes to the
?ect that the occupant must be allowed to do v/hatever the rules and
•rictice permit the opponent of the occunant to do in the air, on the
a and on the ground. The occupant is allowed to fight the economic
r, whose actual nature is the interference within the sphere of the
dividual an'^ especially also within private property v/ith all means,
ich also interfere more deeply with the private sphere than was earlier
nsidered permissible. If the rule of the inviclability of the enemy
vilian population and the enemy private property/" has been broken,- then
" <
does not correspond to International law to demand from 'Germany alone the
pict adherence to rules which wei-e set up in a different historical period
"time. The discrepancy becomes even clearer, if one visuali7.es that
•-So-called spoliation constituted acts in territories, v/hich the
V, .jZ
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lies themselves in the blockade as v/ell as in aerial v/arfare treated as
•>my territory. They, on their part, considered themselves entitled, under
:lation of the former customs of ^Yar and the HLKO, to intervene with regard
life and oroperty in these areas. This is the same property ^vhich the
/secution is trying to protect so painstakingly. Should the occupying power
prohibited from doinr •^'hat its enemies are doinr at the same time?
If the customs of v/arfare have changed with regard to the protection
private property through changes in martial practice as well as
the legal con"^d.ctions of the civilized nations, then the specific
tides of the HLK® pertaining to this protection have become obsolete
sofar as they contradict these customs. The preamble ef the '-^LKO itself
•resses the basic principle vfhich has brought about these changes. Here
is stated that the suffering brought about by war is to be mitigated,
sfar as military necessities permit it. In a war, which is conducted by
sides as a total war, everything demanded by economic warfare is part of
military necessities. This means, thct according to the basic principle of
^LKO, everything is permissible which demands the maintenance and
pengthening of the armament econoiry, and the "\roiding of the consequonces
the Gconomic war condi^ct'^d bv the enemy, blockade war, and aerial i«jarfare.
s includes the operation or closing dovm of factorios or mine-s, tho
"riscation of supplies and all measures of a similar nature. ~ven the
fining of property in industrial
mam
I''
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?:|.lities can be justified from this p®int #f view, if urgent var
juirements of an econemic nature cannot be met in any other v/ay#
All this is confirmed by the evidence which has been introduced in
is trial, esoecially by "^r. '^rube, based on the annlicable regulations
1)
' the United States Armed forces on the treatment of occupied territories*
is mterial goes far beyond what was introduced before ihe and in the
•dustrial trials. For this -reason alone a completely hew recognition by the
cibunal which has to make the findings is necessary. I do not want to
nticipate Dr. Drube in the details, but at least I T/ould like to repeat several
iin points. The service regulations and instruction books of the United States
•my maintain the opinion:
1) The basic principle of military necessity has-priority over the basic
principle of humneness;
2) The economic capacity of the occupied territory can be utilized
for the requirements of the occupation troops as well as for the
furthering cf future military operations. The economy of the
occupied territories is not only to bo brought into accordance
with military necessity, but also into accordance ;vith the
national futiu'c tasks of the occupying powor^
3) The word "war supnlles" in. irticle 53j P^^r. 2 of thn ULKO is to
be given a wide interprntatlon, ^verythinn- constitutes war
supplies that is directly or indirectly useful for the conduct
of the war by the occupant or vhat mdy he of use to him;
U) Private property can be seized in the case of military necessity.
Private property can also be seized in order to prevent it from
falling into the,hands of the enemy.
) Document Books Kehrl Li and IB.
^|l
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5'.) The limitation of the reo^rirements of the civilian population to the
minimum necessary for their existence is permissible in the case
: of military necessity.
If one loolcs at this natter, then it again becomes evident how far
Dntemporary International law >^s become separated from the HLKO. In this
espect we can leave' the question open viihether the documents only show
;ie contents of contemporary International Law, or vhether they helped
0 change International Law, Even if one only wanted to attach to these
rovisions the character of an authentic interpretation of the written or
nwritten rules of warfare, then this would have to be obligatory for the
ribunal which views the evidence. This is aoplicable in the same vray when
'le Tribunal considers itself to be an .unerican l^ilitary Commission or an
iternational Tribunal, after all, one m\ist assume th-i also an International
ribunal, if it has been appointed by the .•imerican Government and filled vath
merican judges, wi"!l recogniz.e these authoritative statements by the
merican Armed Forces.
Besides that, it is of special significance, not for determining the
cplicable International Law, but for the decision of this trial, that
"is defendants cannot be charged with mens rea insofar as in an obviously
reusable mistake they considered that to be permissible v^at the
e^can Armed Ferces consider to be permissible today. Already for the
tter reason the decision will in any case have to be based on the fact,
.e.^her and to whd: extent the actions of the defendants went beyond the
Lmj.ts ''/hich were set up in these regulations of the United States.
n*'I*.
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he presentation of evidence has shown that this V7as not the case»
ae discussion of the individual offenses, with vrhich my client .
as been cha.rged, would go beyond the time limit of this plea. ,
C therefore shall not go into them in detail, especially since ;
the predominant part of the allegations by the prosecution which ;
have so far been made against my client ajre at the same time 'di
rected against the Defendants pleiger, Kehrl, and Rasche, vrhose
defense counsel will go into more detail with regard to those
topics of the prosecution.
As to any responsibility of my client according to criminal
law it is of decisive importance to consider, in addition to the
legal views which I have set forth, and in addition to the actual
statements made on the nature 'end extent of the so-called spolia
tion acts which have been proved by the presentation of evidence,
fan
i-'rhether what occurred was caused by Koerner's attitude, A_s/c'.s
spoliation is concerned, this also depends on how Koemer's posi
tion in the Pour-Year plan and in the Hemann-G-oering-Worhs is
tp be judged. i shall deal with that later.
Koerner
(pa^e 35 of original)
1, With regard to slave labor I refer, in full extent, to opening statement
where I already dealt vfith the question whether or not slave labor is still
criminal today! In this connection I an not speaking of inhumanities or crimes
connected v/ith the treatment of forced laborers. Of all the evidence relevant
to an appraisal of the legal issue I to single out one natter, i.e. the
fact that even now Centrol Council Ordinance No. 2 of 20 Sept. 19U5 is still,
valid in Germany, according to vdiich it is permitted to deport Germans for
forced labor abroad.The Russians did that to a large extent and are still
doing it. is the Tribunal knows, all the Russians did pxirsuant to a controvert
in the Control Council v;as to invoke the Or^iance and an objection raised ha.
to be dropped. In my opening statement I have already referred to the
astonishing fact that,'in February 19i4.7> the Russians objected to the prohibiti
of forced labor in the UNO-Commission for human rights.^) It is very difficiilt
to imagine on vhat grounds deportation to forded labor is to be criminal in
Nurhberg if the ruling four roajor pov/ers in the exercise of their soverign rlgjit
declare such deportations-from Germany permissible in view of the fact
1) Ordinance 3 perinlts the use of Germans for forced labor for the benefit of t.
occupying powers.
2) Koerner TJocur.ient 72, Exh. 317 —document Book IF c
3) Koerner Docur.ient 507, Fxh. 1;39 - Supplement to Document Book IV
» .i* . V' ' ' ' » .
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thai one of then actively engages in it, vrithout the others being able to ^
interfere, and in addition, the saiae fourth major pcriYer, as a natter of princ
takes the vievf before the form of the United Nations that forced labor is
permissible. Iloreover, Germny introduced forced labor under the duress of xie:
whilst the occupying -pcfivers are practicing or tolerating it as applied to a
vanquised Geniiany after the end of the war. Either forced labcr anounfcs to a
violation of a basic human right in which case it is just as much prohibited
if applied to the vanquised party after its unconditional surrender and even
nuch more so because a law of thj.s type must particularly find practical
observance in the event that the power vfhich ought to be in a position to
protect it is no longer in existence, or - as an altermtive - forced labor
entails no violation of such a basic law, in which event its application durii
•war tine redoes not cor^titute orine against hure-nity..
- f .
• • V 9
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From the point of view of higher ethics I condemn forced labor most severely
as being a degradation of nen. I have already e:xpressed this in my opening
statement ..Likewise in my opening statement I expressed the thought that thi.-
Tribunal would make an important contribution to the further development of
International Law if it were to repudia.te, on legal ground-s, any confiction
on the charge of forced labor. I repeat this. Ihere is a great difference bet '^
ween regarding forced labor as abominable on humanitarian grounds and bexng
permitted to punish it on legal grounds. The law valid today
' -,V-;
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and the factual usage of the Yrorld do not justify a conviction. If there exists
any founiation for future lavr it is to be found in adherence -to valid law and in
the unqualified desire to bring about its realization..
Adesire to see justice done v.'ith reserves attached to it is truly no such desir
at all. and lacks every power to set standards and to be binding in effect. The
argunent that the continuity of the administration of justice, as practised
v/ith .,
hitherto in'Kuemberr, is to renain unimpaired,coaibined /the intent to pave nt
vray for future iar by inflicting- penalties, constitutesa reserve of this type.
I\s already set forth by ne, the according of priority to future lavr by setting
aside existing velid law, does not only not aidbut is detrimental to the
development of future 3a.w, Therefore I hold that there can be no conviction on
the count of forced la.bor and I request that everything I have to say on thxs
subject be accepted in "the light of this reserve.
2. In addition, by way of anticipation I vrould like to say the following, in
regard to the special responsibility of my client. Forced assignment of foreig
iibor is a natter of absolutely fundanental inportance. The prosecution are
oistaken if they propose to hold a mn in Koerner-s actual position responsible
for actions which were quite outside the sphere of his conpetency. Consequently
the evidence shows that ry client does net bear any responsibUity for vtot
has happened and thqt in those oases in vdiioh he cane into contact with
erploynent problsns, the attitude taken by him had no influence whatooever on
v/hat was initiated or carried oMt by others;;
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3. I Yvill here olucidr-.te very briefly the purport of the
evidence.
•^'irst of all there is the question of the rcsponsibilit
for the fact that as early as 1940 Poles v/oro allegedly etnplo:
as forced labor in Gorman agriculture. The Prosecution has nou
proved -- except perhaps in individual cases tha.t the employ
ment of those Polos actually took place by force| it merely
proved that State Secretary Backe had such a plan, which, after
initially being opposed by State Secretary S|rrhp, was then ap
proved by him also. Both state socrotaries v/ere completely
independent vis-a-vls State Secretary Koorner. It is not ap
parent, hov/ the discussion in the General Council can make my
client responsible for a plan that others were pursuing and
for which he himself neither took the initiative rlor contribute
anything personally. The General Council bad no authority to ,
roacii decisions, and in this case also it reached no decision,
Koernor'v/as not active at all. It has also been ascertained Ir.
the systematic forced deportation of foreign workers began only
after Sauckel's appointment, which took place in the spring of
1942. Kocrnor bore no responsibility for Sauckel, who was com
pletely independent. Even in January, 1942, one of the chiefs
of the Business Group Labor of the hour Year Plan, who was ropr.
senting Syrup at the time, rocommonded, in a decree to the occq
territories, the
^•' •"• v^--, ,•>• :f:v. \
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prfeparr.tion ol" thG measures necessary in the event that the
introduction of forced labor should be decided upon. This is
proof that still at this date those in the Four Year Plan were
proceeding on the assumption that no compulsory recruitment wo,:
taking place in the occupied territories. For the Business Gr
Allocation' of Labor Koernor likewlso bore no responsibility.
As chairman' of the Aufsichtsrat of the Hermann Goering
Works, Koernor had nothing whatsoever to do T;ith questions of
the employment of foreign workers. Hoithor according to Gorman
corporation law nor in actual practice did that fall within his
province,- Moreover, Kocrncr was ohairman of the Aufsichtsrat
of the Hermann Goering Works only until the spring o± 1942, and
it has not been nrovod that foreign forced labor was. employed
in German industry during .that period.
Likewise, Koerncr's functions as member of the Central
Planning Board cannot establish criminal responsibility on his
part for the compulsory use of foreign manpower. Since the th
other members of the Central Planning Board (Reich Minister Spc ..
liold Marshal Milch, and Minister of Economy Punk) wore found
guilty because of their activity in the Central Planning board,
ampng other things, it at first appears that the fourth member
the defendant Koernor, must also be responsible. Very briefly
I should like to sketch the picture of the Central Planning Boa
that has transpired-. The evidence has corroborated every one o
r •
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the statemonts I made in my opening statement regarding the
central .Planning Board and roerner's total lack of influence iu
it. In addition, contrary to the assumption of the IMT, it ha.
become clear that the Central Planning Board was competent noi
de facto nor de .jure for the recruitment and employment of man
power, and that it had no authority in this sphere. Sauckel
alone was in charge of recruiting manpovirer, and Sauckol v;as nG\
subordinate to the Central Planning Board but only to Hitler,
until; after a long struggle, Spcer, in his capacity as Armaraen
Minister and without any connection with the Central planning
Board, managed to acquire a certain authority in this domain.- f
far as any influence v;as nevertheless exorcised, . on the occasio
of mce-Gings of the Central Planning board, on questions involvi
the recruitment of labor, that vjas not action on the part of- t): •
central Planning Board but Speer^s affair in his capacity as
Armaments Minister, or P'iold Marshal Milch'a affair as Speer's
deputy.- No decision of the Central Planning board on labor
allocation questions is to be found at, all. Perhaps, llRe Spc
and Milch, my client could be held responsible if he had ever
taken any personal activity In the matter of forced labor; hut -
no Instance did he do so. Koerner was not even a Bodarfstraegc
Since, on the other hand, the group of three men of which the
Central Planning board consisted was never active, as such, in
questions of labor allocation Koerner cannot bo held responsibl
because ho was a member of the Central Planning board. The
evidence presented before the IMT did not make clear the true
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naturo of the Central Planning Board. My contention that this
Committee was merely an institute of Speor^s and that Speer alon
and exclusively, possessed the actual power in it, has boon prcv
by the evidence to such a degree that Koerner could not bo held
criminally responsible even if decisions by the Central Plannin
Board regarding the employment of forced labor existed, and evei.
if he had taken part in them. Votes were not even cast in the
Central Planning Board; thoy were only orders of Spoor's. More
over, these orders were not directed to Koernor, but to the
agencies competent for carrying out the programs; and Koernor
not one of thorn. It has been shov/n that the opinion, vdaich evci
the "TJcfcnsc embraced Initially, that a committee of three men
must, per force, be a sort of democratic institution, in which
everyone had his say, and in which everyone must have had some
influence, is completely erroneous. The Central Planning Board
v/as an authoritarian institution, like everything in Hitler* s
state-, and the authority resided in Speer alone, vho, t o be sure
merely carried out, for the most part, decisions which Hitler ha
already reached, Koerner was entirely without influence, and I
was perfectly accurate in saying, in my opening statement, that
here too his behavior in v;hat took place was not even casually
conditioned, to say nothing of his bearing any responsibility
for what happened. He did not collaborate; oojection to the
activity of the others would have been as impossible as it woizld
have been fruitless; and the extent of his entire activity was
minute. All the known stenop-raphic minutes of the Central
Planning Board, embracing thirty-eight meetings
•r' J
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of a total of sixty, comprise 2,036 pages. All the statements
made by Koerner in these meetings amount to a total of not quite
six and a half pages, "What is more, these statements deal mostly
with unimportant things. His case as member of the Central plannir
Board is diametrically antithetical to Speor^s, and also to Field
Marshal. Milch's.
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VI.
Herowlth X have concluded my treatment of the individual
facts. My client was much further down the scale in the hier
archy of the Third Reich than the prosecution supposes. For all
the spheres in which Koerner was active, I shall like to draw the
Tribunal's attention, with particular emphasis, to the fact tha.t
the evidence ha,s reputed everything that might ho construed in
any way as responsibility on Koernbr's pare. The fact runs throug:'
the entire evidence like a red thread that Koerner's position was
not even executive, much less leading', but was -purely mediatory,
and in the domain of the Central Planning Board it was even purely
representative in nature,
Koerner was a State Secretary in the Prussian Ministry of
State, and as such was called upon by Goering for the x-jork in the
Four-Yeax Plan. In this capacity and position he had much smallc--
powers than the State Secretaries in the technical ministries had.
They had the right to represent their ministers to the full exten.
They availed themselves of this right. Koerner did not have this
right, for Goering personally was the Deputy of the Four-yesr Pla,
The task had been tailored to fit him solely and alone; he persona"
possessed the extraordinarily extensive plenipotentiary powers and
authority to issue instructions to all agencies of the State snd
the party. Goering delegated these powers only to two men, namely,
Speer and Sauckel; and this was done on explicit orders from Hltle-
who made these men his own deputies
Vit-i-: i,'' ^
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and subordinated tiiem formally to Goering in order to conceal
from the outside world the extent to which, even then, G-oering
was being deprived of power* In the Four-Year Plan Goering occu
pied the foreground even, more prominently than, in view of his
nature, was the case usually. He overshadowed everything, and per
mitted no one, least of all Koerner, autonomous powers outside his
own narrow-afield, Koerner was Goering^ s deputy only in current
business affairs, that is to say, in matters that took place within
the framework of decisions already laid down by Goering, and which
had to be worked out administratively- Thus, practically speaking,
Kocmer was merely the chief of an administrative office with pri
marily inner-office functions. He himself wished to be no more.
Nor v;as Koerner the superior of•the'various plenipotentiary
generals, business group chiefs, etc., of the Four-Year plan. Tbcy
were directly subordinate to Goering, and, de facto, were much
more influential than Koerner, in the General Council of the Foui-
Year plan, and later in the Economic Leadership Staff East, Koerncxp
to be sure, presided as Goering's deputy; but the evidence has sub
stantiated the fact that neither of these two committees had the
authority to reach decisions, and that Herr Koerner also never
reached independent decisions within the framework of these commlttc
in the field of economic policy or in any other field. Rather,
simply holding the chaii", without other competencies or powers of
his own except that of conducting the proceedings, is a characteris
tic example of the nature of Koerner's activity,
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which was primarily administrative and organizationalj hut not
commanding or ©?en initiative. In the Main Trustee office East also,-
. my client was excluded from the channels of command.
With respect to Koerner's position in the Hermann G-oering Worh
I shall show in my closiag brief what I have already set forth in
my opening statement, namely, that the Aufsichtsrat of a G-erman
Alc-tiengosollschaft, contrary to the regulation under American law,
is not an acting and executive organ, but merely possesses certain
rights of supervision. In addition, according to the statutes of
the Hermann G-oering Works, G-oering himself vras, so to speak, the
super-Aufsichtsrat of the Corporation bearing his name. According
ly, ~in the Hermann Goering Works Koerner did not even have the pO' j
tion normally occupied by the chairman of an Aufsichtsrat; here
too he was overshadowed by Goering's personality, which was endow f
with an altogether extraordinary predominance. He kept everything
in his own hands, jealously saw to it that all decisions of any
importance were reserved to him personally, decreed everything him--
self, intervened in everything himself, and arrogated to himself
the position of Fuehrer of the Hermann Goering Works, which—in
contravention of the provisions of German law—he &Qn had incorpora
ted in the statutes. When, in the spring of 1942, Koorner resigned
from Aufsichtsrat of the Hermann Goering Works, not his least reaso
for doing so was the way in which Goering kept going over his head,
vjhich he no longer found tolerable.
When Koerner's resignation from the Hermann Goering Works
had already been decided upon, he was called to the Central plann.in
Board.
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I have already-expatiated at length on Koerner'e activities in- the
Centr:a Planning Board in connection ;vith the suojeot of forced
labor. But at this time, in order to fit this picture into the
over-all framevjork of Koerner's position, I should like to emphasize
one thing. The Central' Planning Board was created at a time when
G-oering \7as f.-aiing into the background, as compared' to Speer, in
the economic sphere. To a large extent the Pour Year Plan hid lost
its importance. In 'peing called to membership in the Gentr.-d
PI-inning Board, Koerner was by no metins achieving new powers; rather
he entered this committee only so that it should not be too apparent
to the outside world that Goering ii-.d been ellmin-ited. But if
G-oering* s position at this time was -ilready wejik, how much we.-iker.
must Koerner*s position h.-tve been-. Everyone f -.imili-'.r with conditioi
•it that time was perfectly clear on this point, and the evidence
has corroborated it just as clearly.
I will s.-iy only u few words regarding my client as -t person.
The Tribunal has heard, him testify in his own defense. The
Tribunal is also f.-oniliar with the- documents in which his personalM
V
is made m.-tnifest.l/ xhe extreme ideologies of the Party were
alien to Herr Koerner. Where he could help others he did so, and
he w-is not afraid to devote himself wholeheartedly, _ Like so many
in Germany, he believed in the cause he was serving. He also
shares with a great m.iny others the fact that he remained on the
periphery of the events that constituted his -ind the world* s f-ite,
.•Old that he never reached a position in which he himself could
exercise ;uiy influence on these events. Seen from this aspect,
Koerner* s case is unlmport-ijit; and -tt the s.-ime time it is
iraport?tnt because it reflects
\/ Document Book 6.
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what WHS, apart from the outward appear-uice of his position, the
fate of the majorityo He too was caught up in vastly powerful
occurrences thut swept .-ai before them, :ina thut,-both internally
.-uid externally, left infinitely less scope for person.a decisions
than may appear to he the case tod;iy. •
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VII
I shall lef-tl with a number of questions only in my closing
brief j i.a., the question of the necessity -Lnd the legal implica-
tions in acting on orders. In conclusion, I return to what I sal'"!
at the beginning of my presentation. I stress the fact that I aii
not soe.'thing of the principle of. ^ quoque, but p:f ri ch-oige in
international law. Nor -an I spe-iking of events that are merely
infractions of intern.ational law and c-tn neither effect a ch.-inge
nor be cited for purposes of exegesis. Jackson Said,- before the
IMT: "Let me state this clearly: this law, •... if it is to oe of
avail, must condemn aggression on the part'of every other nation,
not excepting those sitting here in judgment."!/ Indeed,
universality of law is inseparable from valid international law.
Jackson's successor as Chief of Counsel of the United States in
Nurnberg, General Taylor, spoke on 28 July 19^''' oefore
the Fifth International Judicial Congress in Geneva ;Lnd dem-.mded
the est.ablishment of a perm-ment world court to promulgate .-tn
international legal code. For, he said, lnternation:'Ll penal
law is now being applied to the citizens of the defeated axis
countries, and he continued, "The trii'tls of war criminals, r.tnd
the principles on which they are based will be stultified oy failu
II2'
to universalize these principles and their attend.-int sanctions.
This shows that General Taylor too .-Ldopts the position that the
Nurnberg principles either must be univeisally vrtlid, or tre not
valid at all. They have not become universal; consequently,
they no longer possess binding force, if they ever had it. What
Gener.'il Taylor feared has t^iken place, and that is what is at
issue here. •
l7 Official Edition, Volume II, page 182.
2/ Koerner Document No. 182-, Exhibit 2C5, Document Book Ill-F,
page 440.
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To be sure, "these principles have not; oeconie ridiculous> since
they are principles of :in etem-il n.iture, which some d^ty ij'ill do
victorious over ,*l11 obstacles. But Nurnoerg's aini) '*to Duild a
new world of just law," huts not so far been achieved, .-ind this
f^Lct must be faced. The conclusion to be draTO from this cjm
only be that we must rtdhere to law as it is, ;ind no longer apply
legal principles that are in penalty not legal principles at all,
but postulates. If that is done, Nurnberg will conclude with a
judgment borne of respect for the binding force of law, -aid thus
with on affirmation of lawfulness in on unlawful world. The
Prosecution is attempting to seclude the Tribun.-il from the worl-^
of today. Nurnberg is to remain fin isl.-ind, I recommend that
this High Tribunal thrust aside that which separates it from the
re tllty of our present day. To be sure, a large part of the
material submitted in this proceedings will become immateri.-a f^i
many decisions, including the judgment I request, n.-unely,
the
aoquittal
of
my
client
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